What Authority Does The President Have Under Article 80 Of The 2014 Constitution Of Tunisia?

What Authority Does The President Have Under Article 80 Of The 2014 Constitution Of Tunisia?

    July 26, 2021   No comments

 

On July 25, the president of Tunisia, Kais Saied, cited article 80 of the ratified 2014 constitution to declare a national emergency. The presidential order suspended the parliament for 30 days, dismissed the prime minister, and lifted immunity on parliamentarians. Here is a translation of the article that the president is relying on to justify and enforce his declaration.

 

Article 80 * Emergency provisions

In the event of imminent danger threatening the nation’s institutions or the security or independence of the country, and hampering the normal functioning of the state, the President of the Republic may take any measures necessitated by the exceptional circumstances, after consultation with the Head of Government and the Speaker of the Assembly of the Representatives of the People and informing the President of the Constitutional Court. The President shall announce the measures in a statement to the people. The measures shall guarantee, as soon as possible, a return to the normal functioning of state institutions and services. The Assembly of the Representatives of the People shall be deemed to be in a state of continuous session throughout such a period. In this situation, the President of the Republic cannot dissolve the Assembly of the Representatives of the People and a motion of censure against the government cannot...

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Journalism and media in Islamic societies in conflict zones

Journalism and media in Islamic societies in conflict zones

    January 08, 2016   No comments

by Ahmed E. Souaiaia

al-Sharq al-Awasat coverage

Journalism in Arab countries: With the increased violence and potential for sectarian war in the Middle East, one would think that the media and journalists would pay more attention to details, facts, and the language they use to report about the death and destruction in that part of the world. Instead, journalist and the media in general sided with their benefactors or religious/ethnic community, betraying the profession and their duty to objectively inform the public.

Al-Sharq al-Awsat, which wanted to be the New York Times of the Arab world showed its true identity: the mouth piece of the rulers of Saudi Arabia. Aljazeera, whose funders wanted it to be the BBC of the Arab world, resigned to its limited true function: serving the Qatari ruling family and its political allies—the Muslim Brotherhood and Turkey. Alarabiya has become the Fox News of the GCC ruling families. Alahram serves Sisi… and the list goes on. 

Here is an example of the kind of headlines the “professional” journalists at al-Sharq al-Awsat ran recently:

5 nations cut their diplomatic relations with Iran… and the world condemn its violations

It did not cross the mind of Iran that its attacks on the Saudi embassy and consulate in Tehran and Mashhad would open the doors of hell on it, including the cutting of diplomatic ties…

[The headlines and opening sentence sound ominous. But the rest of the news story would make you think that you are reading a satirical piece on The Onion or watching a story on the fake news program, The Daily Show. The 5 countries that cut relations with Iran are:

Saudi Arabia (the country the just executed 4 and beheaded 43 including a religious scholar whose crime was “criticizing wali al-amr [the ruler]”)

Bahrain (the tiny kingdom that serves as a bar and resort for the Saudi princes and princesses)

Sudan (Whose president cannot travel much because he faces arrest for war crimes and genocide)

Djibouti (where the hell is Djibouti)

Somalia (does this country actually has a government?)

Arab journalists’ dereliction of duty during these difficult times will make a grave situation graver. In the past, and during peace time, people of that region were used to the media serving as the propaganda tools in the hands of authoritarian rulers. People did not take them seriously. However, with civil wars raging in a handful of Arab countries, the need for accurate information is compelling and Arab journalists ought to take their responsibilities seriously.

Aljazeera devoted half of its space of its website frontpage to reports about the humanitarian crisis in the town of Madaya, Syria, because it is is "Sunni" town. Aljazeera avoided referring to the other towns under siege for years, as the BBC report shows, simply because those towns are inhabited by Shia. To stoke sectarian passion, Aljazeera used graphic images that did not depict people from Madaya.

The legacy of the illegal war on Iraq and the burden of befriending the Wahhabi rulers

The legacy of the illegal war on Iraq and the burden of befriending the Wahhabi rulers

    December 28, 2015   No comments

byAhmed E. Souaiaia

A day after the couple Syed Farook and Tashfeen Malik killed 14 people in San Bernardino, CNN reported that Malik had made “a pledge of allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.” Subsequently, it was reported that Malik attended al-Huda, a religious institute whose funding and curriculum were decided by Saudi benefactors, and Farook visited Saudi Arabia and married his wife in that country. The connection between terrorists and Saudi sponsored religious institutions is well documented. The connection between ISIL and its derivatives, terrorism, and the civil war in Syria and Iraq must be properly understood and factored into any global strategy to combat terrorism and reduce violence around the world. Law enforcement officials’ reaction to the San Bernardino shooting--suggesting that the attack “may have been inspired by ISIS” but “not directed or ordered” by the group--shows that the connection between Saudi political/religious systems and terrorism is not properly made and understood.

Besides the usual claims of responsibility that ISIL releases after the fact, there is no evidence that the group ordered or directed any of the other attacks, including the most recent ones in Beirut, France, and Tunisia. Distinguishing attacks inspired by ISIL from the ones ordered by ISIL reveals a lack of understanding of the ideology and methodology of ISIL and an incoherent response that allow this group to carry out its genocidal agenda. This willful ignorance is present among federal law enforcement officials and political leaders, the main authorities that are supposed to formulate a comprehensive strategy to neutralize and eradicate such threats. Moreover, the occurrence of these brutal attacks in many countries, Muslim and non-Muslim majority ones, underscore the link between the crises in Syria and Iraq and the spread of terrorism. It is now clear, that the longer the Syrian and Iraqi civil wars are allowed to continue the graver the threat of terrorism around the world. Therefore, defeating ISIL in Syria, Libya, and Iraq is necessary to protecting civilians in this country and elsewhere. These conclusions are based on a number of facts.

1. Once in control of territories in Syria and Iraq, and upon declaring himself “caliph,” al-Baghdadiordered, through his spokesperson al-Adnani, all his followers all over the world to carry out all kinds of acts of violence against anyone who disagrees with his interpretation of Islam everywhere—inside or outside Muslim majority countries. The order included specific and appalling instructions about murderous acts and targets. That order was meant to be open as long as the “Islamic State” is in existence. With that being said, the notion that ISIL did not order this or other attacks is factually untrue. 

2. Ideologically, every lone terrorist and every fighter in the ranks of ISIL and its derivatives, from the ones who carried out the 9/11 attacks to the ones who carried out the attacks in Tunisia, follow Salafism. Not all Salafists are ISIL terrorists. However, it is immanently true that all ISIL terrorists are Salafist. Therefore, terrorism cannot be defeated without confronting states that espouse, sponsor, and support Salafism and Salafist figures and force them to purge their educational and religious institutions from hateful and genocidal ideas.

3. The fight against combatant Salafist terrorists of ISIL and its derivatives must be constitutional and within the limits of international law. No government should imprison or kill Salafists based on membership, only combatants in the ranks of ISIL and its derivatives can be pursued so that the war on genocidal fighters is not turned into an ideological war against Salafism or Islam in general. Analogically, the KKK espouses a genocidal ideology not that different from ISIL’s but the US government does not arrest or kill KKK members just for being members. The same standards should be applied to Salafism and fighters affiliated with ISIL and its derivatives to prevent leaders of these groups from using real or perceived Western double standard for propaganda and recruitment purposes.

4. The US’s anti-ISIL coalition has failed to contain, let alone defeat, ISIL because it had embraced a strategy based on the faulty logic of equating the malfeasance of the government of Assad with the crimes of ISIL and its derivatives. The equivalency is factually false for a number of reasons:

4.1. Before and after the peaceful uprising of 2011, Assad’s government has not distinguished among Syrians on the basis of sect or religion. ISIL and its derivatives have.

4.2. During the peaceful uprising, Syrian government’s soldier did not blow up homes belonging to specific religious groups, destroy bridges and public buildings, kill police officers at checkpoints, execute them and chew on their internal organs, and enshrine rape and slavery. FSA and ISIL fighters did. Indeed, some Syrian security forces violently attacked protesters, arrested opposition figures, and tortured political prisoners--common practices among all Arab regimes--and perpetrators of such acts should be held to account. Those who took up arms and hijacked the peaceful uprising should be held responsible, too.

4.3. After the peaceful uprising and during the civil war, Assad’s government did not behead people because they were Christian, Shi`a, secular, or kafir; ISIL and its derivatives did and continue to do so.

4.4. The 250,000 thus far killed were not killed by Assad. They were killed by FSA rebels, fighters from ISIL and its derivatives, and government forces. FSA, which was initially the umbrella organization of all rebel groups including al-Nusra and ISIL, self-documented their fighter committing war crimes and crimes against humanity.

4.5. The millions of displaced Syrians were not forced out by Assad. If they were, why haven't they left before the civil war. They were forced out by ISIL and other armed groups that moved into their neighborhoods, towns, and cities, in violation of international law of war, bringing war to civilian areas. ISIL and its derivatives are the ones who attack communities on religious and sectarian grounds, purging area after area from religious and ethnic groups. Damascus and other cities still controlled by Assad are still inhabited by Sunni, Christian, Shi`a, and Alawites; Alawites, Shi`a, or Yazidisare not able to live in cities under the control of ISIL or its derivatives.

4.6. Assad’s government, as authorized by the old and current constitutions, did not and has not wanted to impose its version of the shari`a on all Syrians. ISIL and its derivatives have.

5. Removing Assad will not remove ISIL, it will strengthen it and here are the facts that support this conclusion:

5.1. In Libya, Qatar and its allies, backed by NATO planes, armed the rebels arguing that removing Qaddafi will end extremism and usher in democracy in that country. Qaddafi was murdered in 2011, yet, just two weeks ago, ISIL’s branch in Libya declared the coastal city of Sirte part of the “Islamic State”, in addition to its other stronghold of Derna.

5.2. In August 2014, Nouri al-Maliki, under pressure from Saudi Arabia and the Obama administration, was forced to resign after having had won the elections by a huge margin, so that ISIL is defeated in Iraq. Instead of being defeated, ISIL was able to take over more cities and provinces, including Ramadi, which lies just 70 miles west of Baghdad.

5.3. Before the Saudi war on Yemen, leaders of ISIL and its derivatives admonished their Yemeni followers for not building significant presence in Yemen. After Saudi Arabia and the coalition of countries under its economic sway bombed that impoverished country for nine months and after they sent Sudanese and even Colombian mercenaries to southern Yemen to push the Houthis and their allies out, ISIL and its derivatives moved in and are now in control of a number of cities and provinces in the south and east of Yemen.

5.4. In Syria, ISIL and its derivatives extended their control over areas previously controlled by the Free Syrian Army and other so-called “moderate” rebel groups. There is no evidence to suggest that “moderate” rebels were, are, or will be able to wrestle away territory from ISIL and its derivatives and hold it for long periods of time. Only the Kurdish fighters, who are not part of the rebel groups, are able to resist and even defeat ISIL, but only within Kurdish majority areas.

5.5. ISIL and its derivatives exist in countries with failed states. If the Syrian government is further weakened or were to collapse, ISIL and its derivatives will fill the void. Therefore, providing support for the Syrian government is the only sensible, practical, and legal option to defeat ISIL and its derivatives.

6. ISIL and its derivatives did not have the capacity to carry out threats around the world and control territory in Syria and Iraq without the political, financial, and military support they have received from individuals and countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey. The evidence presented by the Russian military about oil from areas under the control of ISIL being sold in Turkey is damning. Russia’s evidence, in fact, only confirms what NATO members had communicated to Turkey in September 2014, when they asked Turkey to “tighten its border controls, stem the flow of fighters passing through Turkey, and crack down on the oil smuggling from Syria that is financing ISIL.”

The US administration must push for a principled definition of terrorism and terrorist entities. Administration’s official focus on ISIL, and only ISIL, as a terrorist organization in Syria raises doubt about the US commitment to ending the violence in Syria and fighting all terrorist groups-not just ISIL. US rhetoric criticizing Russia for not limiting its airstrikes to ISIL distorts reality and gives comfort to other genocidal groups and their sponsors. 

When considering that ISIL’s leaders adopted three different namesin the past three years, looking at a name to identify which is or is not a terrorist group becomes absurd. Singling out ISIL as the only terrorist group that should be fought allows the latter’s members to join other groups like al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham, which are equally genocidal in their thinking and practices. After all, al-Nusra was al-Baghdadi’s original armed group in Syria before he had a fall out with al-Julani. Instead, of waiting for groups to self-identify as subscribing to al-Qaeda ideology, the world community must come up with an objective definition of terrorist entities taking into account the nature of the creed, practice, and connections of the group. This way, the name of the group would not matter. What the ideology it espouses and acts it carries out should determine if the terror label shall apply.

Should ISIL and its derivatives be allowed to continue to occupy and control cities in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Nigeria, or Yemen and should the ideology espoused by ISIL fighters go unchallenged, the recent attacks in Beirut, Paris, Tunis, and San Bernardino will not be the last. The US must work with the Syrian and Iraqi governments, now, not in six or eighteen months, to defeat these genocidal fighters. Instead of continuing to send weapons to today’s moderate fighters who will be tomorrows ISIL soldiers, the US and its allies should send those arms to the Syrian government troops, the only legal force on the ground that can defeat ISIL and that can be held responsible for past and future violations of international law of war. If the international community has evidence that Assad or any of his generals have ordered the murder of civilians, they should pursue legal action and seek justice for the victims, not remove him by arming his adversaries in violation of international law. 

If the US administration wants to protect its citizens, end racist and hateful threats against American-Muslims, and stop the flow of refugees, it must develop a principled, not political, strategy to defeat genocidal fighters in Syria and Iraq. It should start by confronting regimes and individuals who provide moral, ideological, financial, and military assistance to ISIL and its derivatives. It is reckless to tolerate ISIL and its derivatives so that Saudi Arabia or any other country achieves some geopolitical goals. It is irresponsible for the US administration to continue to give credence to the bizarre Saudi logic that the presence of one man, Assad, created ISIL and its derivatives, and that his removal will result in ISIL’s defeat. ISIL and its derivatives have existed in many countries not ruled by Assad, and have existed long before Assad’s troops fired a single bullet in Syria’s cruel civil war. As a first step in fighting terrorism, stopping the civil wars that create the suitable environment for terrorism, and ending Saudi spread of hateful, genocidal ideology, Syrian and Iraq must be made whole again.

* Prof. SOUAIAIA teaches at the University of Iowa. His most recent book, Anatomy of Dissent in Islamic Societies, provides a historical and theoretical treatment of rebellious movements and ideas since the rise of Islam. Opinions are the author’s, speaking on matters of public interest; not speaking for the university or any other organization with which he is affiliated.

Proposition for ending the crisis in Syria: concurrent devolution of power regionally and military action against genocidal fighters nationally

Proposition for ending the crisis in Syria: concurrent devolution of power regionally and military action against genocidal fighters nationally

    September 15, 2015   No comments

by Ahmed E. Souaiaia*

 

Syrians as refugees because of this level of destruction of their cities

Politics is the art of compromise. Successful politicians rarely give ultimatums because doing so would limit their ability to navigate complex issues. In 2012, President Obama underestimated the complexity of the crisis in Syria. He drew a “red line” for President Assad: the use of chemical weapons would have “enormous consequences” and would “change [his] calculus” on American military intervention in Syria’s civil war. A year later, someone used weaponized chemicals, killing hundreds of civilians. Although no investigation was conducted to identify the perpetrator at that time, the U.S., encouraged by its regional allies like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey, accused the government of Bashar al-Assad. Just days before world leaders were to meet in New York, U.S. bombing of Syria was all but certain. Then two key events changed the course of history. First, Prime Minister David Cameron, initially supportive of military intervention, was restrained by the British parliament. As of September 7, 2013, the U.S. Congress was also set to not authorize the use of force in Syria, especially if it was not authorized by the UNSC. Second, U.S. Secretary of State, John Kerry, made a “silly mistake”, to borrow the words of some observers.

 

On Monday, September 9, 2013, Kerry, then on his way to a meeting in Europe, made the gaffe that saved his boss. Answering a reporter’s question, he said that Assad could avoid an American attack by turning over “every single bit of his chemical weapons to the international community in the next week.” The State Department tried to take back Kerry's comments by saying that he “was making a rhetorical argument about the impossibility and unlikelihood of Assad turning over chemical weapons he has denied he used.” Nonetheless, Russia’s President, Vladimir Putin, put Kerry in check:  Moscow urged Syria to place its chemical weapons under international control. The next day, the Syrian government “welcomed” Russia’s proposal. The U.S. Senate, having scheduled a vote for Wednesday on whether to back a proposed punitive strike, postponed it. The U.S.-planned “surgical strike” against Syria did not take place. 

In hindsight, and given the abysmal results of the yearlong airstrikes on ISIL, the U.S. administration should be thankful for Russia’s intervention that allowed Obama to save face, while eliminating a dangerous weapon that could be used by the Syrian government or its opponents if storing facilities fell under their control. Above all, Russia’s plan for Syria’s chemical weapons was a lifeline for President Obama, who was headed for defeat, at least in the House, on his request for approval for military action.

Fast-forward to September 2015. Russia, once again, might be offering the U.S. and its allies a lifeline: an opening to chart a new course for its military and political plans in Syria. Clearly, U.S. bombardment of ISIL positions from the air is not producing any significant results, and the U.S. cannot find a reliable “moderate” partner that could hold cleared territory.

Since the start of the Syrian crisis, the U.S. and its regional allies—Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey—have insisted that Bashar al-Assad must step down before they stop their support for rebel fighters. In fact, the AKP-led Turkish government has insisted that it would not fight ISIL unless it and its allies are allowed to fight the Syrian government troops as well. In other words, working with the Syrian government to combat terrorism is out of the question in the eyes of these governments. Russia, on the other hand, has insisted that fighting terror groups in Syria must be a priority and must be coordinated with the Syrian government.

There is a growing body of evidence pointing to the fact that U.S.-Saudi position is untenable. 

First, Turkey is now fighting its own war on terror at home. ISIL suicide bombers have killed Turkish citizens inside Turkey. The AKP government chose to re-open its war on Kurdish fighters and ignore the threats posed by ISIL. Some Turkish towns are now off-limits to Turkish government forces.

Second, the U.S. planto train and equip “moderate” rebel fighters and use them to fight ISIL on the ground in Syria has failed in a spectacular way: the first group of fighters inserted into Syria was immediately attacked by al-Nusra, killing many of its members and capturing the rest. Moreover, a leader of this U.S.-trained group declared that his fighters will never attack their “brothers in jihad,” which of course would include ISIL.

Third, al-Nusra has been reluctant to enter into open war against ISIL. Last week, al-Nusra’s overall leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, ordered the group to cooperate with ISIL, despite his rejection of ISIL’s declared restoration of the caliphate under the leadership of al-Baghdadi.

Fourth, Saudi Arabia has claimed that Assad lost legitimacy because he has killed civilians in Syria. Now that Saudi Arabia is bombing civilians in Yemen and siding with an unelected ruler of that country, they have lost that moral high ground. The Saudis, Qataris, Bahrainis, and Emaritis are all involved in an illegal brutal war. It is also possible that that Saudi Arabia will lose territory to the Houthis before the war on Yemen is over. The Saudi rulers themselves might face serious criminal charges since they stand accused of committing war crimes in Yemen.

Fifth, the refugee crisis is spreading to Europe, and the longer the crisis in Syria is made to last the more people will be leaving that country. Only an end to the violence and the creation of an international recovery plan could stop the flow of refugees. The countries that supported the armed rebellion are responsible for the humanitarian disaster and for recovery costs.

Sixth, even if President Assad were to step down or be removed, there is no evidence that members of the warring factions will stop fighting, lay down their arms, and go back to doing what they were doing before the crisis. Events in Iraq, Libya, and Yemen indicate that armed groups are intent on taking over and holding territories. These non-state actors are not wrestling away control over towns and cities from government forces only, but also from each other. These groups do not believe in the devolution of power, they want all power for themselves forever and through the gun.

The war in Syria is a classic proxy war going bad. Too many states have too many proxy fighters all fighting the Syrian state and each other. Relying on non-state actors to carry out violence against the state is a dangerous and destabilizing strategy that will affect not only the target country, but other nations in the region and around the world. Violence will reach neighboring nations like Lebanon, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan and the refugee crisis will continue to affect Western countries. The war in Syria and Iraq must end in order to minimize the spread of violence and the increased number of displaced people. However, for the war to end, states party to this conflict must employ both military and political strategies concurrently—not just one or the other. 

The concurrent military and political solution is necessitated by the following facts:

1. The Syrian government will not be able to re-establish pre-crisis conditions. Too many people have died, too many people have been displaced, there has been too much destruction, and there is too little trust and good will—making it impossible to start a reconciliation and recovery phase without the inclusion of local leaders.

2. Syria has been flooded with all kinds of weapons and ammunition, making the task of keeping peace and order all over Syria a herculean one. The government will need some of the armed groups to manage some of the towns and cities that were outside the control of the Syrian state.

3. Syria has always been a mixed society. The country consists of an amalgam of sectarian, religious, ethnic, and tribal communities. During the crisis, and when the government failed to protect all citizens in all of Syria, these communities armed their own local committees (lijan sha`biyya/difa` dhati) to defend their towns and cities of residence. It is unlikely that these traumatized communities will disarm immediately and trust their fate to this or a future government—with or without Assad. 

4. While some armed groups are interested in preserving the diversity of the Syrian society, other fighters who embrace and practice genocidal ideas, like ISIL, al-Nusra,  and Ahrar al-Sham are determined to cleanse the regions they control of ethnic, sectarian, religious, secular, and any group that is not them. Moreover, these genocidal groups do not believe in any degree of public participation in electing regional or national political and administrative leaders. 

These facts create a set of conditions and variables that require a concurrent military and political solution. A solution that supports the national government’s fight against genocidal fighters and put Syria on a path to deliberate devolution of power. The devolution of power could be achieved through purposeful political reform that would allow towns and cities a healthy degree of autonomy without risking the territorial integrity of their country and the abrupt collapse of the state. The fate and future of Assad and his government can be determined after local governments have been established, through national elections under a new constitution that reflects the new conditions.

The Russian military buildup in Syria might provide the world community with an opportunity to start an effective collective plan of action in Syria. The Western coalition that has been bombing ISIL from the air for more than one year without success could have another partner, who is not the Assad regime, on the ground. Russian troops could open the necessary channel of communication between the Western coalition and the Syrian government. Together, and after securing authorization from and monitoring by the UNSC, the Syrian and Russian troops could secure local elections in towns and cities freed from genocidal fighters. These local elections will provide some opposition figures with a chance to gain power, through the ballet box, over regions where they have influence and if they have influence. 

This approach will necessarily mean that Kurdish regions, Shia towns and cities, and tribal communities (`asha’ir) will emerge as self-governing, semi-autonomous regions within Syria. This kind of solution would preserve Syria’s state institutions, offer Syria’s minorities a degree of self-rule, and fight genocidal warriors. A Saudi-Western solution preconditioned on the removal of Assad and his generals will cause the disintegration of Syria, the permanent displacement of millions of Syrians, and the spread of violence to neighboring states. In the end, peace in Syria depends on a gradual devolution of power and diminished use of violence by non-state actors. It cannot depend on using those non-state actors simply as tools for regime change.

____________

* Prof. SOUAIAIA teaches at the University of Iowa. His most recent book, Anatomy of Dissent in Islamic Societies, provides a historical and theoretical treatment of rebellious movements and ideas since the rise of Islam. Opinions are the author’s, speaking on matters of public interest; not speaking for the university or any other organization with which he is affiliated.