Showing posts with label Conflict. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Conflict. Show all posts

Thursday, May 26, 2016

Kurds One Hundred Years after Sykes-Picot

    May 26, 2016   No comments
by Mohammad Ali Dastmali*

About one hundred years have passed since the conclusion of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and now neither Sykes is alive nor Picot.

Britain’s Sir Mark Sykes and France’s François Georges-Picot started a saga through conclusion of a short and apparently simple agreement, which later on affected the lives of many peoples and nations in the Middle East and became a turning point for determining the fate of Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Palestinians and other people in the Middle East.

Now, in the modern times in which unlike one hundred years ago, Britain and France are not big global powers, as was the case in the time of Sykes and Picot, and the United States, Russia and regional powers are more determining and more powerful than others, Kurds have decided to change the situation in their own favor. The question is “when there is talk about Kurds objecting to Sykes-Picot’s approach to borders and political structure in the region, does it represent the dynamic and consolidated demands of all Kurds in the region?” The answer is no, because unlike past decades, Kurds, and in clearer terms, Kurdish parties in four countries of Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria, are not of the same opinion when it comes to necessity of independence and secession, and establishment of a common geographical unit. They are not only discordant in practice, but do not even support such an ideal in their slogans. The following points are noteworthy in this regard:

1. In Iran, due to many reasons, including special bonds that exist between Kurdish people and the Iranian society in general, extreme weakness and withering away of various anti-government parties, the fact that such parties do not enjoy strong political and popular base, and also due to religious and other differences, Kurds are not on course to raise any protest or rise against the Sykes-Picot Agreement.

2. In Turkey, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), as the most important political and military Kurdish group in this country, has chosen such a course that its jailed leader has frequently announced there is no need for Kurds to seek independence and establish a government of their own. On the other hand, at least during the past year, this party has become so weak and has suffered such heavy casualties that it cannot practically have a serious say in this regard. Also, it is not unlikely that judicial immunity of PKK lawmakers at Turkey’s national assembly would be revoked in the next coming months as a result of which the way would be paved for leaders and other effective members of the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP), which is the most important legal institution affiliated with the PKK, to go to jail. At the same time, the PKK has not been able to take its name off the list of international terrorist groups and, as such, does not enjoy international legitimacy.

3. In the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, the situation is quite different and there is the highest preparedness and willingness to build an official, separate and independent Kurdish entity among political parties in this region. Masoud Barzani is the vanguard in this regard and is doing his best to take this case to a final positive closure during the period of his political and personal life. Of course, there are serious differences among various Kurdish parties in Iraq, which follow different nationalist, leftist, Islamist and social democrat approaches, over a variety of issues and interests, but when it comes to the necessity of dismantling the Sykes-Picot Agreement and form an independent Kurdish government in Iraq, all of them are unanimous and even if there is a difference in this regard it is about such marginal issues as the timetable and ways of achieving this goal.

4. In three Kurdish regions of Syria, that is, in Jazira, Kobani, and Afrin, political and military institutions affiliated with the PKK have full control over the power reins. They enjoy a special geographic and defensive position as a result of which, with the exception of Daesh and other terrorist and Takfiri groups, they can cooperate with the United States, Russia, Syria’s President Bashar Assad, and even Iran and others. Although this group of Kurds is still on Bashar Assad’s side in line with an unwritten agreement, they have raised certain claims about how to manage these regions, which have not been accepted by the government in Damascus. As a result, during the latest conflicts in Syrian city of Hasakah, more than 10 armed man affiliated with Assad’s army were killed by Kurds and more than 100 Syrian soldiers were taken into captivity by Kurdish defenders. Therefore, if the scenario, which seeks to oust Assad from power, is put in gears, Kurds in these regions would seek to establish a political structure, and even if it would not be an independent state, it would not be anything less than the current structure in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region either. However, even if Assad remains in power, Syrian Kurds would not go back to the past situation.

What if the Iraqi Kurdistan Region declares independence?

It is possible that in order to declare their independence, Kurds would not wait for permission from the United States, Europe, Iraq, Iran and other regional countries forever, and may face these countries with fait accompli. In view of the current situation in Iraq and the country’s ailing government, it seems that not only there would be no firm opposition in the face of such a possibility, but it is even not improbable that part of Shia political institutions and a large portion of Sunnis would agree to it. In the meantime, let’s not forget that in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, Kurds enjoy such facilities and important drivers for independence as military and defensive power in the form of the Peshmerga forces, relative economic power based on the region’s oil and gas reserves, as well as official international relations and political experience. In recent years, Kurds have proven in Iraq and Syria that they have no problem with non-Kurdish citizens in their region, but can also make them a partner to their political and executive power by giving big concessions. It should be also noted that serious threats posed by the Daesh Takfiri terrorist group and dangerous measures taken by this group in Iraq and Syria, in addition to serious fight against Daesh by Kurds have all created a new situation in the region, which makes resilience toward and interaction with Kurds look like a wise and logical option.

It may seem strange, but it is very unlikely that a sudden declaration of independence by Kurds in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region would elicit sharp international reactions. Now, one must wait and see whether the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, especially the Kurdistan Democratic Party and its leader Masoud Barzani, would accept such a risk, or prefer to listen to their consultants and neighbors and defer the implementation of the secession scenario to a later time.
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* Expert on Turkey Affairs

Sunday, June 8, 2014

Why have many Syrians voted for Bashar al-Assad and what is the U.S. administration’s alternative to elections it does not particularly like?

    June 08, 2014   No comments

by Ahmed E. Souaiaia*
Syrians vote, June 3, 2014.

Most Western governments and some observers argue that the elections that took place in Syria on June 3, 2014 were not legitimate because not all Syrians were able (or willing) to participate, they were held under war conditions, and Syrians were coerced into voting for the current president. These would be reasonable arguments if they were consistently applied. A brief examination of similar cases and relevant facts reveals that this is not the case.


First, U.S. administrations have overseen numerous elections and produced national constitutions under war conditions and in the middle of sectarian strife in Afghanistan and Iraq. Administration officials have often argued that even under these circumstances, elections and referendums are necessary to instill democratic tradition, isolate extremists, and legitimize governments. Are these functions of democracy not applicable in Syria?


Second, 56 percent of Egyptian voters did not take part in the recent elections that endorsed former military chief Abdul Fattah al-Sisi. Moreover, al-Sisi came to power after overthrowing a president who was legitimately elected by higher voter participation and who faced stronger challengers. Yet the U.S. administration, the rulers of Saudi Arabia, and many Western governments readily embraced al-Sisi despite his weak mandate, the extraordinary events that preceded the elections, and the harsh measures (introduced under his watch) that stifled dissent and criminalized journalists and members of the opposition.


Third, contending that Syrians voted the way they did because they were fearful and coerced is an insult to all Syrians, both those who voted and those who did not vote. Such a contention depicts them as cowards, incapable of making proper decisions without outside help. Syrians, who have been living under extreme conditions for more than three years now, could have chosen to stay at home (as some did) instead of risking their lives to put a dot of ink on a piece of paper. After all, most Syrians knew that Bashar al-Assad would win and that the West would not recognize the results. But many Syrians, for a myriad of reasons, wanted to vote for al-Assad. It is important to remember that earlier studies commissioned by NATO and Western entities predicted that Assad would win by about 60 percent, which explains why elections were not part of any political solution supported by the Western governments. Instead, they favored a negotiated power transfer to an opposition coalition that represents less than 4 percent of the population.


There are many reasons why Syrians enthusiastically thronged polling stations inside and outside Syria to vote for al-Assad, some literally with their own blood instead of ink. With instability, civil wars, and weak governments resulting from short-sighted Western meddling, it is understandable that many people in the Middle East prefer to spite the U.S. and its rich Arab allies by voting for the person most disliked by the West.


Instead of considering the actual facts and motives, U.S. administration officials, the French government, and rulers of some of the Gulf States continue to ignore the will and welfare of the Syrian people without providing credible alternatives. They claim that Bashar al-Assad is out of touch and has lost legitimacy. Let’s consider some specifics.


On the same day the Syrian government announced the results of the presidential elections in which 88% of Syrian voters, with 73% turnout, elected Bashar al-Assad, Secretary Kerry arrived in Lebanon. Speaking in Beirut, he declared that “the elections [in Syria] are non-elections. A great big zero… Nothing has changed between the day before the election and after.”


Ironically for someone who described President Assad as out of touch with reality, Kerry was speaking in a country that has had no president for two weeks now (a situation that may persist for months), was without any government for more than ten months, and whose lawmakers decided to give themselves a 16-month extension of their term (presumably will now end in November 2014). That willful cognitive dissonance is symptomatic of Western governments’ utter failure to present a credible alternative even as they criticize the governments and governmental processes of countries they do not like. Moreover, some of the countries they are propping up as acceptable models are not even functional, let alone democratic and stable.


First, Iraq, which just held its first post-U.S. occupation legislative elections, continues to struggle with security, economic, and political challenges. Because of the strange power-sharing arrangement introduced under the watch of Western occupation forces, Iraq has a parliament deeply divided along sectarian, ethnic, and ideological lines, making it difficult to form a strong and stable government in the near future.


Second, Libya, “freed” from Qaddafi’s grip three years ago by an alliance between Qatar (which financed and armed rebel groups) and NATO (which provided the airpower) is facing its own civil war, pitting secular military generals against Islamist armed groups, some of whom are affiliated with al-Qaeda. Moreover, instability and availability of all kinds of weapons in the hands of all kinds of armed groups are threatening the stability of neighboring countries like Tunisia, Egypt, and Algeria—three countries with fragile governments and strong presence of al-Qaeda affiliates.


Third, other Arab allies of the U.S. are exemplars of tyranny and authoritarianism, not responsible governance. These allies include countries like Bahrain which continues to abuse peaceful protesters, Saudi Arabia which criminalizes dissent and jails human rights activists, and Qatar which imprisons poets and abuses foreign laborers and immigrants. None of these countries have held elections—farcical or otherwise. Those three countries in particular have no tradition of representative governance and some of their religious authorities have even decreed that elections are proscribed based on their interpretation of Islamic law.


Historically, the U.S. administration and its main regional ally, Saudi Arabia, have promoted custom-made, top-down controlled models of governance where they balance power by rewarding warlords and ethnic and religious factions with tools that paralyze governments instead of making them functional. The 1989 Ta`if Agreement, which changed the power-sharing formula in Lebanon, and the constitution of Iraq, inked under the watch of U.S. forces, are good examples of tightly tailored political tools that cannot allow for the emergence of governments empowered by the people. Instead, these tools produce regimes that are dependent on regional or international backers.


All this ultimately shows that U.S. foreign policymakers are willing to support anti-democratic and ultimately unstable governments instead of investing in, and accepting the consequences of, participatory democracies. Though the U.S. may not like the short-term outcomes of developing democratic processes, it is in everyone’s long-term interest to stop purposefully undermining—whether by intentionally booby-trapping or by rejecting the legitimacy of—those political processes.
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* Prof. SOUAIAIA teaches at the University of Iowa. His most recent book, Anatomy of Dissent in Islamic Societies, provides a historical and theoretical treatment of rebellious movements and ideas since the rise of Islam. Opinions are the author’s, speaking on matters of public interest; not speaking for the university or any other organization with which he is affiliated.

Sunday, April 13, 2014

Is Ukraine becoming for the West what Syria has been for Russia?

    April 13, 2014   No comments





Riding the wave of protests known as the Arab Spring, many Syrians rallied to demand more political and civil rights. Without the hesitancy that characterized their initial reaction to the protest movements in Tunisia and Egypt, Western administrations and some of the Persian Gulf regimes immediately threw their support behind the protesters. Assad’s regime belonged to the so-called non-moderate Arab governments and the protesters offered the West and its allies an opportunity to overthrow it. They formed the “Friends of Syria” group, now consisting of only eleven nations, to provide the opposition with all needed support, including deadly arms, to achieve that goal. After three years of brutal war, Syria’s economy and society are severely damaged and its allies, mainly Russia, China, and Iran have invested a huge political, economic, and military capital to help the Syrian government survive. The Friends of Syria claimed that Assad became illegitimate because he killed Syrians. Assad claimed that he was fighting armed terrorists and thugs.

Now fast-forward to 2013. 


In November of last year (2013), in Ukraine, President Yanukovych's cabinet voted to abandon an agreement on closer trade ties with EU in favor of economic co-operation with Russia. Reacting to this decision, tens of thousands of people attended a demonstration in Kiev. In early December, protesters occupied Kiev city hall and Independence Square. 
To shore up support for Ukrainian government, Russian President Vladimir Putin offered to buy out $15 billion of Ukrainian debt. Protesters grew more violent and by the end of February 2014, more than 90 people were killed including dozens of police and security personnel. Consequently, President Yanukovych left Kiev only to be deposed by the parliament, a move he rejected as illegal. Russia, in the meantime, declared the new regime in Kiev illegitimate and moved to annex Crimea and build its troops along the border threatening to move in should Russia speaking minorities in eastern Ukraine be harmed.

Taking their cues from Crimeans, many eastern Ukranians launched their own protest movement, taking over government buildings and military installations, and demanding a new constitution that would grant them more autonomy. Kiev reacted by sending more troops. The next steps will determine if Ukraine falls into prolonged armed struggle, like Syria, or reach a political settlement. 

If all parties have learned anything from the Syrian crisis, they should know that a Syrian style conflict, which will be essentially another proxy war, will create another global humanitarian and economic crisis. The outcome of the proposed quartet (Russia, U.S. Ukraine, and the EU) meeting, should it happen, will provide more clues about the direction of this crisis.  Should they ignore the similarities between the crises in Ukraine and Syria, Ukraine will be for the West what Syria has been for Russia in the last three years: political and diplomatic vortex.

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* Prof. SOUAIAIA teaches at the University of Iowa. His most recent book, Anatomy of Dissent in Islamic Societies, provides a historical and theoretical treatment of rebellious movements and ideas since the rise of Islam. Opinions are the author’s, speaking on matters of public interest; not speaking for the university or any other organization with which he is affiliated.

Tuesday, October 15, 2013

A Moroccan view on Catalan independence: Madrid's continued support for the independence movement in the Western Sahara is hypocritical when compared with their attitude towards independence movements closer to home

    October 15, 2013   No comments
by Hassan Masiky*
Sahara

Behind Spain’s European veil is a country struggling to deal with its painful history. Catalonians’ quest for independence exposes Spaniards’ agony over Franco’s legacy and the destructive historical ramifications of the dictator’s actions in Europe and North Africa. For Moroccans, Madrid’s opposition to Catalans’ rights to self-determination while Spain supports the same rights for the Western Sahara represents an example of Spain’s’ political hypocrisy and dual personality.
Since Morocco seized the Western Sahara from Spain in 1975, Madrid has been publically and covertly supporting the Polisario Front separatists’ call for the self-determination of the former Spanish colony. While Moroccan diplomacy struggled to counter Madrid’s meticulously designed campaign to keep Rabat bogged down in the Sahara, indigenous minorities across Spain stared to ask for their rights to self-rule.

For years, Spain’s support for the Algeria based Polisario Front did not carry any political liability for the Iberian country. However, the nationalist awakening of the Catalan people turned Madrid’s policy in North Africa into a heavy diplomatic encumbrance.

Spanish civil society and partisan parties were Polisario’s first supporters. The former Marxist guerilla movement enjoyed a considerable diplomatic, financial and moral support from the right and the left across Spain’s’ political spectrum. Under the guise of “right to self-determination”, numerous Spanish politicians, human rights activists, writers and actors adopted the Sahrawi cause.

Moroccans watched helplessly as Spain’s support of the Polisario thrust the Sahara conflict onto the world stage. The Spanish government and civil society’s active enthusiasm were instrumental in the rise of Polisario’s profile worldwide. Former Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar engagement in this campaign was significant and deliberate

During PM Aznar’s tenure (2001-2004), Moroccan-Spanish relations deteriorated significantly. In the eyes of the Polisario leadership, Aznar moved “the Saharawi file towards a solution that respects the Saharawi people's inalienable right to self-determination." The former PM’s sympathy for the Polisario positions was not a proclamation of love for the people of the Western Sahara but rather a major element of his strategy to weaken Morocco.

In Rabat, Moroccans were mystified with Aznar’s right wing Partido Popular (PP) crusade to grant Sahrawi independence knowing the PP‘s disdain for Catalan and Basque nationalists. As Spanish “right wingers” continued their support for the former Marxist Polisario Front, the PP attacked and ridiculed Catalan nationalists.

Madrid contends that Catalans do not “deserve” an independent homeland based on flimsy facts that can easily be dispelled using the Polisario arguments for secession from Morocco. In an interview with the Wall Street Journal in 2012, Aznar dismissed Catalonia’s independence as “Constitutionally impossible” since Catalonians “voted for the 1978 Spanish Constitution”. During the same interview, the former MP stated that Catalans are Spanish and have been part of a “historic nation in Europe for 500 years.”

Moroccans find such statements by a former high ranking Spanish statesman insulting, since Rabat argues the same position at the United Nations to dispel the Polisario arguments for an independent Sahara. The Western Sahara never existed as an independent country and has been part of the Kingdom of Morocco longer than 500 years.

For the Catalans and the Basques, their central government's explicit support for the right to self-determination in the case of the Moroccan Sahrawi, must be extended to all minorities in Spain. It is incomprehensible to hear Spain’s current Prime Minister Rajoy state at the United Nations that his country “is maintaining its commitment to finding a fair, long-lasting and mutually acceptable political solution to the Western Sahara dispute that allows for the free determination of the Sahrawi people in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter”. Meanwhile, the Spanish government is actively engaged in a secret war against Catalan independence.

As Catalan nationalist campaigns keep on gaining European sympathy, Madrid has started to review its long held pro-Western Sahara independence positions. In a startling reversal of position, Spanish Socialists (PSOE) and PP parliamentarians shunned a recent visit by pro-Polisario parliamentarians to the Morocco controlled Sahara, despite their membership in the Cortes “intergroup on friendship with Western Sahara”.

Catalan and Basque political groups spearheaded this visit to the city of Laayoune intensifying their campaign to link the Saharan conflict to Catalonia’s drive for independence, thus using Madrid’s current and past positions calling for the Sahrawi rights to self-determination to highlight their central government illusory attitude.

Judging from Madrid's recent cool attitudes toward the Polisario, Spain appears to be falling into the same trap the PP dug for Morocco in the Western Sahara. On close inspection, none of the central government's anti- Catalonia independence arguments holds up. The contention that the Catalonian vote for the 1978 constitution makes their current demands for independence illegal is injudicious, since the balloting took place three years after the demise of the brutal Franco dictatorship when most of the country was still recovering from a political jolt.

Madrid must recognize the transition underway in Catalonia. Moreover, Spain, as a member of the European Union, should grant the Catalan people the basic right to vote on self-rule. Despite harassments and legal hurdles, a simmering Catalan nationalist movement is thriving and will eventually achieve its goal of creating an independent homeland. Meanwhile, the central government self-denial undermines Spain image as a democratic nation.

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* Hassan Masiky is a freelance journalist and former advisor to Amnesty International USA.

Tuesday, October 1, 2013

Syria's Kurds, hopes and fears: The civil war in Syria has put great strains on the country's Kurdish population. The Syrian Kurds' most powerful politician, Saleh Muslim Mohammad, talks to Vicken Cheterian about their position and future

    October 01, 2013   No comments
by Vicken Cheterian*
Saleh Muslim Mohammad is the head of the Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat (Democratic Union Party / PYD) and the most powerful politician among the Syrian Kurds. The party - founded in 2003, and closely linked to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which has waged a longstanding armed campaign in the Kurdish-majority regions of eastern Turkey - itself has a well-disciplined fighting force of several thousands among the Kurds of northern Syria. During a recent visit to Geneva to meet international organisations, I ask him for his assessment of the Kurds' situation in light of Syria's evolving war.

Saleh Muslim Mohammad's attitude is confident: that of a leader who at last was on the winning side after decades of being repressed by dictatorship and buffeted by the unpredictable tides hitting the middle east. He was also concerned to uphold his own group's standpoint: “Very often, the international bodies receive information from rival Syrian-Kurdish groups which tries to present us in a negative light. We came here to present our point of view and the facts on the ground.” His fighters, he says, are constantly clashing with jihadi formations in the northern regions of Syria.

Mohammad was born in Kobani, or Ayn al-Arab, in 1951. “You know that Kobane was founded by Armenians?” he tells me to my surprise. “The name Kobani is German (from Ko-Bahn, or railway company). The town was a simple railway station built by Germans in 1912, as part of the Berlin-Baghdad route. Then, in 1915, it became a town when Armenian refugees escaping the massacres in Anatolia settled there. The Kurds came later from neighbouring villages. I remember when I grew up there were three Armenian churches in town, but in the 1960s they abandoned us and migrated to Armenia.”

He attended primary school in Damascus and secondary school in Aleppo, then moved to Istanbul to study chemical engineering at Istanbul Technical University before moving to work in Saudi Arabia. He belongs to a Kurdish political generation that was inspired first by the Barzanis' struggle against the Iraqi Ba'ath regime, then attracted to the PKK's militant nationalism. He has been president of the PYD since 2010.

The ideological matrix

His comment on the clashes with jihadists prompts me to ask: is the PYD in a war situation, and if yes against whom? “We have been at war since our foundation in 2003", he replies. "First against the [Syrian] regime - remember at that time it was on good terms with Turkey. We paid a heavy toll. Ahmad Hussein (Abu Judy) was killed by the military intelligence under torture in 2004; in the same year Shilan Kobani and his friends were assassinated in Mosul by the mukhabarat; in 2008, Othman Suleiman was also killed under torture. There are many other such examples. I was myself arrested and tortured. We also had to struggle against other Syrian Kurdish formations who considered us troublemakers, but we are revolutionaries and we did not give in.”

I am about to ask about accusations that the PYD cooperates with the Syrian authorities, when he says: “We are the only Kurdish formation that fought against the regime in Ashrafiye and Sheikh Maqsoud” (two neighbourhoods of Aleppo inhabited mostly by Kurds).

“On 19 July 2012 we managed to take control of the Kurdish regions and instal self-rule. The regime forces withdrew. But then ee fell into another problem, that is fighting with salafi-jihadi formations. Now we are fighting both regime forces and Jabhat al-Nusra, and we fear that massive crimes can happen against civilians of Ashrafiye and Sheikh Maqsoud. These neighbourhoods are constantly shelled by the regular troops, and under siege by jihadis. We call the international community to intervene to stop the danger of massacres."

But, I intervene, wasn't the withdrawal of regime troops in July 2012 coordinated with the PYD? He answers: “That's a false allegation. We put pressure on the regime forces, and they did not have the means to open a new front against us. They still remembered how the Kurds all rose up as one in the Qamishli intifada of 2004. In Ras al-Ayn where the population is half-Kurdish and half-Arab, we entered only Kurdish neighbourhoods. The Arabs there supported the regime. Then the jihadi groups entered and started killing people, and when they started attacking Kurdish neighbourhoods we fought back and eventually expelled them from the town.”

I change tack. At the time the Syrian National Congress was formed, relations between it and other parts of the opposition YPG were difficult. How have they evolved since then? “Let me start from the beginning. When the Syrian revolution started, we were searching for a strategic alliance. We set up the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change with four other groups - the Communist Party, Communist Action Party, Communist Party - Political Bureau, and the Socialist Union. They were the ones with long experience of anti-regime struggle and representation within the society. Our project was to overthrow the regime through peaceful democratic means, rejecting violence. Then a fake opposition was set-up in Istanbul with United States-Turkish backing and Qatari funding. The reality became an internal opposition which has no representation, and an exiled opposition which has no presence on the ground.”

He adds: “It was the regime that wanted the militarisation of the revolution, because it had the military advantage. It released some 1,000 salafi-jihadis from Sednaya prison [a notorious jail near Damascus]. And they succeeded. Who talks about democracy now? Even the most moderate fighting brigade [of the opposition] is demanding the caliphate now!”

In a one-hour discussion, Saleh Muslim Mohammad refers twice to the “philosophy of Abdullah Ocalan” as the PYD's reference-point. This ideological source can best be described as a Leninist one as adapted to the needs of a national-liberation struggle. In this, the PKK itself was heavily influenced by the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) factions of the 1970s. This ideological set-up has little in common with most Syrian opposition fighting groups, which have gravitated towards the salafi-jihadi political culture.

“The Syrian National Council was in the hands of the Muslim Brotherhood and controlled by Turkey. When the coalition was founded and moved to Cairo, we thought it would form an independent structure. But in the end it evolved into an amorphous body lacking cohesion and eventually returned to Istanbul.”

The regional complex

I ask whether he understands the fears of the Syrian opposition that the PYD is preparing conditions for separation from Syria. “There is no basis for such fears. There is no single Kurdish party in Syria calling for separatism. Demanding our rights is not separatism.”  But in your literature, I persist, you do not talk about northern Syria, but about west Kurdistan. Isn’t this a political sign? He says that west Kurdistan is "not a political term, but a geographic one. There were people who wanted that we forget our Kurdish identity.”

This brings me to the nub of the matter: is the PYD a Syrian or a Kurdish party? A laugh, then: “It is Kurdish, Syrian, middle eastern. We had Arabs, Assyrians, and Turcomans in our party. We follow the philosophy of Ocalan, and whoever is convinced by it can join us.”

The PYD's analysis largely turns around who is with, and who opposes, the Turkish state. Yet Saleh Muslim himself made two visits to Turkey in summer 2013. Is that a sign of changing times? “We have no animosity towards the Turkish people. We share with Turkey a border of 900 kilometress where there are Kurdish populations on both sides. We expressed our concerns that Turkey is providing logistic support to jihadi groups like Al-Nusra, which they refuted. But we have continuous proof of that. Even now, fighting rages between us and jihadi groups in villages east of Ras Al-Ayn. We also talked about easing humanitarian convoys to our regions.”

Did the start of negotiations between the PKK leadership and Ankara prepare the environment for his visit? “For us, nothing has changed. But [the talks] helped to soften Turkish attitudes toward us. When they themselves negotiate with their own Kurds it is untenable to ask the Syrian coalition not to negotiate with Syrian Kurds.”

When I ask who was his negotiating partner on the Turkish side, he remains vague, saying   only it was on the level of advisor to the foreign minister, without giving names. But he says a third visit is not excluded.

Many Syrian opposition activists view the PYD through the prism of its anti-regime struggle. Similarly, the PYD regards the Syrian opposition from the angle of its own antagonism towards Ankara. To understand the PYD, it's necessary to look at the Syrian conflict against a broader canvas: namely, the emergence of the Kurdish political factor throughout the middle east, the establishment of the Kurdish Regional Government in northern Iraq, and especially the role of the PKK in awakening Kurdish national identity within Turkey. In the event of an agreement between the PKK and Ankara, there could be a rapprochement between the  PYD and the Syrian opposition - though the opposite is also true.

When I ask about the role of the United Nations in the Syrian conflict, he laughs again and says: “You know, in the mid-90s the UN was going to shut down when the US refused to pay its dues. Did I answer you?”

So how can the conflict in Syria end? “Very difficult! I feel there are sides who want the destruction not only of Syria, but of the whole region by igniting a Sunni-Shi'a conflict…”

Here, I interrupt, saying that I do not like blaming outsiders; such conspiracy theories are also fashionable in my country of origin, Lebanon, as if we are not actors but simple objects. Saleh Muslim Mohammad agrees, adding: “The problem is that our mentality did not develop enough to ensure the independence of our thought and action.”
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*Vicken Cheterian is a journalist and political analyst. He works for the non-profit governance organisation CIMERA, based in Geneva; teaches at Webster Geneva's faculty of media communications; and is a research associate at SOAS's department of development studies. His books include From Perestroika to Rainbow Revolutions: Reform and Revolution after Communism (C Hurst, 2013) and War and Peace in the Caucasus: Russia’s Troubled Frontier (C Hurst, 2009; Columbia University Press, 2009)

Tuesday, January 17, 2012

Impact of an embargo on Iranian oil

    January 17, 2012   No comments

Strait of Hormuz

International news has been dominated by the Iranian issue these days. Not only the nuclear dispute is present front and center, but military confrontation was moved from the threat level to active planning level. In return, Iran put its cards on the table. Any attack on its nuclear facility will force it to attack all parties involved and all military bases in the region. Then, Iran announced that even in the absence of war, and if an oil embargo is imposed, it will close the Strait of Hormuz because it sees such sanctions as a declaration of war. A recent study, published by Chatham House, an influential think tank based in London, discussed the possible outcomes of an EU embargo on oil exports from Iran. The author made five key conclusions:
  • The initial impact is that the EU countries will have to find alternative supplies to replace their imports of heavy, sour crude from Iran.
  • The hunt for alternative supplies will create transitional friction for oil prices. Thus prices for heavy source crude in the Atlantic basin markets would increase and in Asia-Pacific they would decrease as Iran tried to find alternative outlets for the crude originally destined for European markets. 
  • So far the analysis has assumed that Iran simply accepts the EU embargo without retaliation. This is extremely unlikely.
  • There has been much speculation that Iran's response would be to inhibit the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. This is unlikely. First, any closure would equally damage Iran's ability to export the oil on which its economy is so dependent. Second, serious and credible attempts to close the Strait are in effect Iran's 'big guns' on the issue of whether or not the United States (or Israel) would launch a military attack on      Iran. 
  • A more effective means of putting pressure on Iran would be for the United States to persuade the EU to extend sanctions to financial transactions. An oil embargo alone cannot succeed.

The study remains speculative and overlooks many other critical variables. Importantly, while the author gave ample space to western adaptation to the fallout of an oil embargo, it did not factor in Iran’s ability to adapt as well. The threat of closing the Strait alone increased the prices of oil. An actual instance of violence will devastate the world economy.

The author also estimated that Iran would not close the Strait because doing so would affect its own oil export. That may be true, but that neglects the fact that the closure of the Strait would impact other Gulf States more than Iran. Without the Strait being sealed, Iran’s export would be already impacted by the sanctions.  With the Strait sealed, other Gulf States will be effectively under an embargo as well. Specifically. Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar will not be able to export any oil for the duration of any violence in the Persian Gulf. In other words, 40% of world supply will be impacted; but 100% of the oil export of those three countries will be shut down.

Lastly, Iran’s revenues from oil export are about 60%, relatively high. But the Gulf States dependency on oil export is even higher.

In conclusion, western powers ought to revisit their math and assess the likelihood of imposing more sanctions on Iran would bring about change that would outweigh further damage to the global economy and bring about the desired outcome in terms of Iran's behavior.



  

Thursday, January 5, 2012

Turkey and Iran navigate the Middle East tense issues

    January 05, 2012   No comments
via RCReadersFeed

Ali Akbar Salihi and Ahmet DavutoÄŸlu 
Turkish Foreign Minister held a joint press conference with his Iranian counterpart, Ali Akbar Salihi, in Tehran and reiterated his fear that the volatile Middle East might be headed for a new Cold War era unless a sectarian rift in Iraq is immediately mended. Ahmet DavutoÄŸlu has urged Iranian officials to cooperate with Turkey in its efforts to stop the Sunni and Shiite sects from clashing in politically-fragile Iraq.
Before arriving in Tehran, DavutoÄŸlu accused “certain actors” in the region of having sought to recreate the circumstances of the Cold War era, and reiterated Turkey's call for “overarching policies” for the region. To emphasized the similarity between the situations in Iraq and Syria, DavutoÄŸlu stressed the “urgent need for solidarity." He argued:

"Turkey and Iran can contribute to a solution in Iraq and Syria. The regional awakening in the Middle East will make us and our relations stronger. We are now laying the foundations of an era that could last a century. States should not base their policies on sectarian and ethnic tensions.”

In a press conference on Thursday DavutoÄŸlu affirmed the close partnership between Turkey and Iran, denying claims that the NATO defense shield Turkey permitted in eastern Anatolia was meant to target Iran, a country the US has made no secret that it labels as a threat. He contended that Turkish leaders trust Iranian leaders:  
“We do not regard any country a threat to us; we confide in Iran and Iran confides in us; the trust is mutual... This is for defensive purposes only. We guarantee that this is not a threat to Iran. We would never take any step that could negatively affect our relations with our neighbor."
The range of topics discussed during the two day visit highlights the complexity of issues facing the countries of the region, especially Turkey and Iran.

Read also:
Axis of... Power: emerging alliances in the Islamic world

Sunday, January 1, 2012

U.S. sanctions on Iran are answered: announcement of new nuclear achievement

    January 01, 2012   No comments
On the same day the U.S. president signed a bill containing new sanctions on Iran, the latter said its engineers have succeeded in producing a nuclear fuel rod, a major achievement for the country’s nuclear ambitions.


Nuclear fuel rods are used at power plants. They contain small pellets of fuel, usually low-enriched uranium, patterned in a way allowing them to give out heat produced by nuclear reaction without melting down. Building one is a technological challenge, which Iran was thought incapable of overcoming.

According to the Iranian Nuclear Agency, the first rod produced by the country domestically has already been inserted into a research reactor, although it did not specify whether the device was loaded with fuel or not.

On Saturday President Barack Obama signed a controversial multibillion-dollar defense bill that contained new sanctions on Iran, which was said to reduce Tehran’s oil revenues and is expected to force the country into making its nuclear program more transparent. An Iranian official, the head of Chamber of Commerce Mohammad Nahavandian dismissed the new sanctions as “unjustifiable.”


In the past several weeks, Iran has been in the news since the Israeli media broke a story that some Israeli leaders were actively drawing out plans for attacking Iranian nuclear sites. Then, mysterious explosions rocked two military sites in Iran before that country announced the downing of a top-secret U.S. spy drone. While the Iranian navy was conducting a ten day war games near the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran threatened to close if U.S. and EU impose sanctions on its oil export, the administration approved a $30 billion deal setting fighter jets to Saudi Arabia.


Without doubt, even if Iran fails to shut down the Strait, any military tension in that region could raise the price of oil to at least $200—a blow to a fragile world economy.

Thursday, December 8, 2011

Saudi rulers' depraved indifference

    December 08, 2011   No comments

 The manufacturing and toleration of supremacism
by Ahmed E. Souaiaia*

Even before 9-11, before the U.S. war in Afghanistan, and before the war in Iraq, suicide bombers had targeted civilian Shiite worshipers in mosques and public places in a number of countries. The state of lawlessness created by war merely expanded this heinous trend to Iraq. Now, months before the scheduled U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, the cruelty of supremacism was on display December 6, 2011 when a suicide bomber struck a crowd of Shiite worshipers at a mosque in Kabul, killing at least 57 people. Four other Shiites were killed in Mazar-i-Sharif when a bomb strapped to a bicycle exploded in a gathering celebrating `Ashura. The Kabul bomber blew himself up in the midst of a crowd of men, women and children gathered outside the Abul Fazl shrine to commemorate the death of the Prophet Muhammad's grandson, Hussain.


These are criminal acts that cannot be justified on religious or ideological ground no matter the context. Taking a clear stand against the targeting of civilians, regardless of the victims’ religion, nationality, ethnicity, and any other distinguishing characteristic, is the best way to stop it from spreading to other places and targeting other ethnic and religious groups. Consistency and principled condemnation of this genocidal behavior is the only sure way of stopping the spread of the supremacist ideology that fuels it. To her credit, Secretary Clinton did the right thing when she issued an immediate condemnation:

"These attacks directed at worshipers marking the Shia holy day of Ashura are deplorable, and those responsible show their complete disregard for the efforts of the Afghan people to make their country more stable, more peaceful, and more democratic.”

This condemnation is a step in the right direction but it is not enough for two reasons. 

First, in a time when the U.S. is imposing more sanctions on Iran that are bound to hurt the Iranian people despite many claims to the contrary, the administration needs to send a strong message that their political and ideological conflict with the Iranian government does not devalue the life of the Shiite people. Second, given the religious identity of the perpetrators, the U.S. needs to pressure its allies, a number of the Gulf States, who are known supporters of the groups that espouse indiscriminate murder.

Specifically, Saudi Arabia, being the main sponsor of these extreme sects that embrace supremacism should speak forcefully and loudly against this criminal behavior and deadly creed. The U.S. should use its influence to make the Saudi religious and political authorities do more in this regard.

In this and many other cases, it is evident that the creed of the perpetrators is well known: a belief that followers of all sects that are not Sunni (Wahhabi that is) are heretics and should repent or die. The enablers and supporters of this cruel ideology are also knowable. All evidence points to the fact that Saudi Arabia has been an incubator for sects that are exclusivist in their beliefs, hateful in their practices, and racist in their view of others. They kill men, women, and children and they even desecrate graves and cemeteries.

The generic term used by western authorities that identifies al-Qaeda as the exemplar and promoter of such cruelty and disregard to human life is not adequately specific. Al-Qaeda is only one manifestation of supremacism that is deeply rooted in Saudi religious practices and teachings. The U.S. is morally obliged to ask its ally, Saudi Arabia, to end and undo its brainwashing of its youth and the youth of the Muslim communities worldwide given that the two allies were the enablers and promoters of this stream of supremacism in the 1980’s. Then, the two allies used supremacist teachings to recruit zealots to fight the Soviets. Now, the Saudis are using them to remain relevant in an awakened Arab world.

There is no place for a belief system that commands the killing of people of other faiths. The Saudi version of Islam has promoted this genocidal culture. It is genocidal because it teaches the elimination of an entire religious group simply because it is deemed heretic. Many followers of the Saudi manufactured supremacist sects detest dissent, demonize innovation, and loathe reason. They see their creed as superior to all others and they use their oil-generated wealth to subjugate the vulnerable. Sure, all people, including the Saudi Salafists, have the right to believe in whatever dogma they choose, but when their beliefs translate into acts of indiscriminate killing, they forfeit that right.

So far, the Saudi rulers have never publicly condemned the bombing of Shiites civilians. Their silence, given their relation to the perpetrators, amounts to implicit approval. The Saudi rulers’ silence to cruelty and genocidal acts carried by individuals influenced by their teachings is shocking to human conscience. Their financial and moral support to select supremacist groups in Arab Spring countries is an attempt to control the Arab revolutions. These groups have already used violence to impose censorship and to segregate students in Tunisia and Egypt. If the problem is not properly identified and methodically solved, more Tunisian, Egyptian, Moroccan, and other Muslims and non-Muslims will be their next targets.

Naturally, the Saudi-sponsored Salafists should have a space at the table and should be encouraged to participate in the governing process. They should be able to participate in the political life. But they cannot deny others the right to exist and live in peace. The Saudis should use their endless wealth to raise awareness against this supremacist creed they helped create.

The Saudi institutions and wealthy individuals, as the main sponsors of the exclusivist stream of supremacism, ought to speak louder than anyone else. They should declare clearly and publicly that it is not acceptable to kill people because they don’t share their beliefs. So far, the Saudi rulers have never expressed sorrow and condolence when Shiites were mass murdered. This suspicious silence is in and of itself a damning indictment. They stand guilty of moral and criminal depraved indifference and they continue to ignore the problem they had helped create.
__________
* Prof. SOUAIAIA teaches at the University of Iowa with joint appointments in International Studies, Islamic Studies, and College of Law. He is the author of the book Contesting Justice. Opinions expressed herein are the author’s, speaking as a citizen on matters of public interest; not speaking for the university or any other organization with which he is affiliated.

*****
Appendix

This is a sample, non-exhaustive list of reported attacks on Shiite Muslims perpetrated by self-proclaimed Sunni Muslims (primarily Saudi influenced supremacist groups) as headlined in local and international media outlets. The Saudis can help end this murderous ritual by condemning them in the most certain and clear terms possible.
_____________________
1995: Azam Tariq, a Pakistani Sunni cleric leader of the Islamist party Sipah-i-Sahaba, publicly calls for attacks on Shiites in Pakistan.
Sep 1996: More than 200 people are killed when Sunnis attacked Shiites in Kurram, Pakistan
In 1997: Sunni extremists assassinate 75 Shiite leaders in Pakistan
In 1998: The Taliban under the command of Abdullah Dadullah, massacre dozens of Shiites in Afghanistan
February 26, 2002: At least 11 Shia worshipers were killed by indiscriminate firing by a group of masked gunmen at the Shah-i-Najaf Mosque in Rawalpindi.
April 2002: In the first four months of 2002 Sunni Pakistani militias kill 17 doctors, 4 lawyers, 5 journalists, 4 teachers and 16 government officials of the Shiite minority in Karachi
June 8, 2003: Members of the Sunni terrorist group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi kill 11 police officers of the Shia community in Balochistan, Pakistan
July 4, 2003: At least 47 people were killed and 150 injured in an attack on a Shia mosque in the south-western Pakistani city of Quetta.
March 2, 2004: In the deadliest coordinated attacks since the fall of Saddam Hussein, a series of explosions killed 181 Shiites celebrating the Ashoura in Baghdad and Karbala. 49 Iranian pilgrims were among the victims of the bombings.
May 14, 2004: Six members of Shia family were shot dead in Mughalpura locality of Lahore.
May 17, 2004: Pakistani militants start using suicide attacks in a coordinated manner with the attacks on Karachi that kill 100 Shiites
May 31, 2004: A suicide bomber blew up the Imambarghah Ali Raza mosque in Karachi in the middle of evening prayers, killing 16 worshipers and injuring 35.
September 21, 2004: Suspected Sipah-e-Sahaba members gunned down at least three members of a Shi'a family in a sectarian attack in Dera Ismail Khan.
October 1, 2004: A suicide bombing left 25 people dead and dozen injured at a Shia mosque after Friday prayers in the eastern city of Sialkot.
October 10, 2004: An explosion by a suicide bomber at a mosque used by Shiite Muslims in Lahore killed at least four people and left eight injured.
March 19, 2005: a suicide bombing kills more than 35 people in an Afghan Shiite mosque in Fatehpur in Jhal Magsi District, Balochistan.
December 8, 2005: more than 30 people are killed in a bomb blast at the Fatehpu shrine in Pakistan.
February 18, 2005: Iraq mosque attacks kill 17 in Shiite ceremony.
February 9, 2006: Sectarian violence marred the holiest day of the Shiite calendar, with at least 36 people killed.
April 3, 2006: Ten die and 38 are wounded during a suicide truck bomb attack near a Shiite mosque in northeastern Baghdad
April 7, 2006: Two or three suicide bombers target the Baratha mosque in Baghdad, killing 85 people and wounding 160.
July 14, 2006: Allama Hassan Turabi, a Shiite religious scholar and leader of Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan, and his 12-year-old nephew were killed in a suicide attack near his Abbas Town residence.
October 6, 2006:  23 Shiites are killed by a suicide bomber in Pakistan.
January 27, 2007: A suicide bomber kills 15 people at a Shiite mosque in Peshawar, Pakistan
January 19, 2008: Two million pilgrims today marched through Karbala to mark Ashura, as 68 people were killed and 200 injured.
December 2008: A Taliban suicide bomber kills 16 Shiites including 13 schoolchildren in a town at the border with Pakistan .
February 2009: A suicide bomber kills more than 25 people at a Shiite funeral procession in Dera Ismail Khan in north-west Pakistan
March 27, 2009: 76 persons were killed and over 100 injured in an apparent suicide attack on a Shia mosque at Peshawar-Torkham Highway in Jamrud.
Apr 2009: Three suicide bombs in 24 hours in Pakistan, including an attack on a Shiite mosque in Islamabad that kills 26 people
June 2009: A suicide bomber kills 38 people at a Shiite mosque near Upper Dir in north-west Pakistan.
July 29, 2009: A remote controlled car bomb killed two men guarding a Shia lawyer in Dera Ismail Khan.
August 10, 2009: Bombings targeting Shiites across Iraq kill at least 45 killed.
September 2009: More than 30 Shiites are killed by a suicide bomber in Astarzai (Pakistan) claimed by Lahskar-e-Jhangvi.
December 2009: 43 Shiites are killed in a suicide bomb attack by the Pakistani Taliban of Asmatullah Bhittani in Karachi, Pakistan.
February 05, 2010: Two bombs targeting Shiite Muslims exploded in Pakistan's largest city Friday, one outside a hospital treating victims from the first blast hours earlier. At least 25 people were killed and around 100 others wounded.
May 28, 2010: Two bomb attacks on Shiite worshippers in Pakistan leave dozens dead.
July 2010: A suicide attack on a Sufi shrine in Lahore, Pakistan, kills 40 people.
November 2010: 67 people are killed by a suicide bomb attack on a Shiite mosque in north-west Pakistan.
December 2010: A suicide car bomber of a Sunni militant group kills 11 Shiite people in Hangu, north-west Pakistan.
December 13, 2010: 4 dead, 26 wounded in attacks on Shiite pilgrims in Iraq.
August 31, 2011: Eleven people were killed in Quetta following a bombing outside a mosque when Shi'a Muslim worshippers belonging to the Hazara community were conducting Eid prayers.
November 24, 2011: Death toll rises in Iraq triple bombing, nearly 20 Shiite worshippers killed.
December 2011: At least 58 people, mostly Shiites, are killed by Sunni terrorists in Afghanistan.

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